Allocation of objects with conditional property rights

Quesada, Antonio (2009): Allocation of objects with conditional property rights. Unpublished.

Abstract

This paper considers the allocation of indivisible goods among members of a collective assuming that individuals are given the right to retain certain goods when some individuals alter the allocation problem. The assignment of rights is exhaustive in that, for every good x, either individual i can exercise a right over x against j or j against i. It is shown that the only Pareto efficient allocation rules satisfying these requirements are those having a hierarchy of diarchies.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Allocation rule; hierarchy of diarchies; indivisible good; property right.
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D70 - General; D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis

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