Logo
Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Bilateral Approach to the Secretary Problem

David M., Ramsey and Krzysztof, Szajowski (2000): Bilateral Approach to the Secretary Problem. Published in: Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games , Vol. 7, (2005): pp. 271-284.

Warning
There is a more recent version of this item available.
[thumbnail of MPRA_paper_19888.pdf]
Preview
PDF
MPRA_paper_19888.pdf

Download (232kB) | Preview

Abstract

A mathematical model of competitive selection of the applicants for a post is considered. There are N applicants of similar qualifications on an interview list. The applicants come in a random order and their salary demands are distinct. Two managers, I and II, will interview them one at a time. The aim of the manager is to obtain the applicant which demands minimal salary. The candidate can be accepted only at the moment of its appearance. When both manager want to accept the same candidate, then some rule of assignment to one of the manager is applied. Any candidate hired by the manager will accept the offer with some given probability. An candidate can be hired only at the moment of its appearance. At each moment n one candidate is presented. The considered problem is a generalisation of <i best choice problem></i> the best choice problem with uncertain employment and the game version of it with priority or random priority. The general stopping game model is constructed. The algorithms of construction of the game value and the equilibrium strategies are given. An example is solved.

Available Versions of this Item

Atom RSS 1.0 RSS 2.0

Contact us: mpra@ub.uni-muenchen.de

This repository has been built using EPrints software.

MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by Logo of the University Library LMU Munich.