Armstrong, Mark and Zhou, Jidong (2010): Conditioning prices on search behaviour.
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We consider a market in which firms can partially observe each consumer's search behavior in the market. In our main model, a firm knows whether a consumer is visiting it for the first time or whether she is returning after a previous visit. Firms have an incentive to offer a lower price on a first visit than a return visit, so that new consumers are offered a "buy-now" discount. The ability to offer such discounts acts to raise all prices in the market. If firms cannot commit to their buy-later price, in many cases firms make "exploding" offers, and consumers never return to a previously sampled firm. Likewise, if firms must charge the same price to all consumers, regardless of search history, we show that they sometimes have the incentive to make exploding offers. We also consider other ways in which firms could use information about search behaviour to determine their prices.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Conditioning prices on search behaviour|
|Keywords:||Consumer search; oligopoly; price discrimination; high-pressure selling; exploding offers; costly recall|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure and Pricing > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L15 - Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
|Depositing User:||Mark Armstrong|
|Date Deposited:||15. Jan 2010 14:14|
|Last Modified:||18. Feb 2013 23:44|