Manipulation in oligopoly

Corchon, Luis and Silva, Jose Luis (1994): Manipulation in oligopoly. Unpublished.

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to generalize the results obtained by Sklivas (1987) and Fershtman and Judd (1987) allowing for non-linear demand functions, many players and general attitudes to the risk by the players. We also generalize their set-up by introducing a more general measure of th aggresivity of players in the second stage of the game.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Incentives; Manager; Strategic Substitutes; Strategic Complements; Two Stage Games
• Subjects: L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L21 - Business Objectives of the Firm; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation; M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting > M5 - Personnel Economics > M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs, seniority issues)

References

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Fershtman, Judd (1987). "Equilibrium incentives in oligopoly". American Economic Review.

Friedman, J (1982). "Oligopoly Theory". Handbook of Industrial Organization. North Holland

Sklivas, S. (1987). "The strategic choice of managerial incentives". Rand Journal of Economics.

Vickers, J. (1985). "Delegation and the theory of the firm". Economic Journal. Supplement.