Corchon, Luis and Dahm, Matthias (2009): Welfare Maximizing Contest Success Functions when the Planner Cannot Commit.
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We analyze how a contest organizer chooses the winner when the contestants.efforts are already exerted and commitment to the use of a given contest success function is not possible. We define the notion of rationalizability in mixed-strategies to capture such a situation. Our approach allows to derive different contest success functions depending on the aims and attitudes of the decider. We derive contest success functions which are closely related to commonly used functions providing new support for them. By taking into account social welfare considerations our approach bridges the contest literature and the recent literature on political economy.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Welfare Maximizing Contest Success Functions when the Planner Cannot Commit|
|English Title:||Welfare Maximizing Contest Success Functions when the Planner Cannot Commit|
|Keywords:||Endogenous Contests; Contest Success Function; Mixed-Strategies.|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games
|Depositing User:||Luis C. Corchon|
|Date Deposited:||18. Jan 2010 10:51|
|Last Modified:||16. Feb 2013 04:57|
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Welfare Maximizing Contest Success Functions when the Planner Cannot Commit. (deposited 20. Nov 2009 16:31)
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