Kinateder, Markus (2009): Delayed Perfect Monitoring in Repeated Games.
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Delayed perfect monitoring in an in�nitely repeated discounted game is studied. A player perfectly observes any other player's action choice with a fixed, but finite delay. The observational delays between different pairs of players are heterogeneous and asymmetric. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the set of belief-free equilibria is reduced under certain conditions. This model applies to any situation in which there is a heterogeneous delay between information generation and the players-reaction to it.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Delayed Perfect Monitoring in Repeated Games|
|Keywords:||Repeated Game, Delayed Perfect Monitoring, Folk Theorem|
|Subjects:||C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
|Depositing User:||Markus Kinateder|
|Date Deposited:||04. Feb 2010 18:32|
|Last Modified:||15. Feb 2013 00:05|
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