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Adverse Selection, Segmented Markets, and the Role of Monetary Policy

Williamson, Stephen and Sanches, Daniel (2009): Adverse Selection, Segmented Markets, and the Role of Monetary Policy.

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Abstract

A model is constructed in which trading partners are asymmetrically informed about future trading opportunities and where spatial and informational frictions limit arbitrage between markets. These frictions create an inefficiency relative to a full information equilibrium, and the extent of this inefficiency is affected by monetary policy. A Friedman rule is optimal under a wide range of circumstances, including ones where segmented markets limit the extent of monetary policy intervention.

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