Kilenthong, Weerachart and Townsend, Robert (2010): Information-Constrained Optima with Retrading: An Externality and Its Market-Based Solution.
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This paper studies the efficiency of competitive equilibria in environments with a moral hazard problem and unobserved states, both with retrading in ex post spot markets. The interaction between private information problems and the possibility of retrade creates an externality, unless preferences have special, restrictive properties. The externality is internalized by allowing agents to contract ex ante on market fundamentals determining the spot price or interest rate, over and above contracting on actions and outputs. Then competitive equilibria are equivalent with the appropriate notion of constrained Pareto optimality. Examples show that it is possible to have multiple market fundamentals or price islands, created endogenously in equilibrium.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Information-Constrained Optima with Retrading: An Externality and Its Market-Based Solution|
|English Title:||Information-Constrained Optima with Retrading: An Externality and Its Market-Based Solution|
|Keywords:||Externalities; Private information; Moral hazard; Retrading; Walrasian equilibrium; Constrained efficiency; Decentralization|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D62 - Externalities
D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
D - Microeconomics > D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium > D51 - Exchange and Production Economies
|Depositing User:||Weerachart Kilenthong|
|Date Deposited:||14. Apr 2010 23:09|
|Last Modified:||13. Feb 2013 13:20|
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