Djumashev, Ratbek (2006): Corrupt Bureaucracy and Growth.
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In this paper, we analyze implications of corruption on growth. We extend existing growth models by incorporating ubiquitous corruption as a by-product of the public sector. Corruption affects both taxation and public good provision, and therefore causes income redistribution and inefficiencies in the public sector. These effects of corruption lead to lower growth through distortions of investment incentives and resources allocation.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Institution:||Department of Economics, Monash University|
|Original Title:||Corrupt Bureaucracy and Growth|
|Keywords:||Corruption; growth; public goods; tax evasion|
|Subjects:||H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods > H40 - General
D - Microeconomics > D9 - Intertemporal Choice and Growth > D92 - Intertemporal Firm Choice and Growth, Financing, Investment, and Capacity
O - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O17 - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, Macroeconomic Policy, and General Outlook > E60 - General
|Depositing User:||Ratbek Dzhumashev|
|Date Deposited:||08. Mar 2007|
|Last Modified:||12. Feb 2013 18:47|
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