Duersch, Peter and Oechssler, Joerg and Schipper, Burkhard C (2010): Unbeatable Imitation.
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We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule "imitate-the-best" can hardly be beaten by any other decision rule. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable and show that it can only be beaten by much in games that are of the rock-scissors-paper variety. Thus, in many interesting examples, like 2x2 games, Cournot duopoly, price competition, rent seeking, public goods games, common pool resource games, minimum effort coordination games, arms race, search, bargaining, etc., imitation cannot be beaten by much even by a very clever opponent.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Unbeatable Imitation|
|Keywords:||Imitate-the-best, learning, symmetric games, relative payoffs, zero-sum games, rock-paper-scissors, finite population ESS, potential games, quasisubmodular games, quasisupermodular games, quasiconcave games, aggregative games|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure and Pricing > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games
|Depositing User:||Burkhard C Schipper|
|Date Deposited:||22. Feb 2010 11:25|
|Last Modified:||19. Feb 2013 08:59|
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