Medina, Leandro and Lema, Daniel (2004): Electoral Budget Cycles: The case of the Argentine Provinces.
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This paper presents subnational evidence of electoraly-motivated changes in the level of public expenditures, budgetary deficits and composition of public expenditures in Argentina. The empirical study is made using a dynamic panel data analysis (GMM) for 22 provinces during period 1985-2001. We find evidence of political cycles in policies around the election date. Results shows that deficits and public expenditures increase in election years. Evidence also suggest that expenditures shift toward more visible public investment and away from current consumption goods.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Electoral Budget Cycles: The case of the Argentine Provinces|
|English Title:||Electoral Budget Cycles: The case of the Argentine Provinces|
|Keywords:||Electoral Budget Cycles, Argentina, Political Economy, Fiscal Policy|
|Subjects:||E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, Macroeconomic Policy, and General Outlook > E62 - Fiscal Policy
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
|Depositing User:||Leandro Medina|
|Date Deposited:||19. Mar 2010 22:47|
|Last Modified:||15. Feb 2013 03:04|
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