Siddiqi, Hammad (2009): The Puzzle of a Unique Instrument in Emerging Markets of South Asia.
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A unique instrument has been associated with emerging markets of India and Pakistan. We show that the instrument can be considered a market response to the information gaps in these markets. The instrument may credibly transmit information and may eliminate information gaps. Hence, the birth of the instrument is, perhaps, an example of a creative market response to information problems.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||The Puzzle of a Unique Instrument in Emerging Markets of South Asia|
|Keywords:||Information Asymmetry; Information Transmission; Emerging Markets; Perfect Bayesian Equilibria; Badla Finance|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D00 - General
G - Financial Economics > G0 - General
|Depositing User:||Hammad Siddiqi|
|Date Deposited:||31. Mar 2010 06:01|
|Last Modified:||13. Feb 2013 11:17|
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