Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Voluntary Contributions by Consent or Dissent

Tan, Jonathan H.W. and Breitmoser, Yves and Bolle, Friedel (2010): Voluntary Contributions by Consent or Dissent.

[img]
Preview
PDF
MPRA_paper_22001.pdf

Download (239Kb) | Preview

Abstract

We study games where voluntary contributions can be adjusted until a steady state is found. In consent games contributions start at zero and can be increased by consent, and in dissent games contributions start high and can be decreased by dissent. Equilibrium analysis predicts free riding in consent games but, in contrast, as much as socially efficient outcomes in dissent games. In our experiment, inexperienced subjects contribute high in consent games and low in dissent games, but behavior converges toward equilibrium predictions over time and eventually experienced subjects contribute as predicted: low in consent games and high in dissent games. Observed deviations from equilibrium in consent games are best explained by level-k reasoning, and those in dissent games are best explained by hierarchical reasoning formalized as nested logit equilibrium.

UB_LMU-Logo
MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by
the Munich University Library in Germany.