Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Régulation d'un duopole et R&D environnementale

Ben Youssef, Slim and Dinar, Zeineb (2009): Régulation d'un duopole et R&D environnementale.

WarningThere is a more recent version of this item available.
[img]
Preview
PDF
MPRA_paper_22340.pdf

Download (120Kb) | Preview

Abstract

We develop a three stage game model composed of a regulator and two firms. These firms compete on the same market where they offer the same homogeneous good, and can invest in R&D to lower their emission/output ratio. By means of a tax per-unit of pollution and a subsidy per-unit of R&D level, the regulator can induce the first best outcome.

Available Versions of this Item

UB_LMU-Logo
MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by
the Munich University Library in Germany.