Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Transfert de technologie sur une ville circulaire

Bouguezzi, Fehmi (2010): Transfert de technologie sur une ville circulaire.

[img]
Preview
PDF
MPRA_paper_22417.pdf

Download (147kB) | Preview

Abstract

This paper compares three licensing regimes in a symmetric duopoly model situated on a circular city à la Salop. One of the firms holds a patent allowing to reduce the marginal production cost and decides to license its innovation under a fixed fee or a royalty regimes or not to license. The paper shows that fixed fee licensing is better than no licensing for a non drastic innovation which contradicts the result found by Poddar and Sinha (2004) in a linear model. Results also show that, for a non drastic innovation, fixed fee licensing is better than royalty licensing and the opposite for a drastic innovation. Finally, I show that optimal licensing regime for the patent holding firm when innovation is not drastic is fixed fee and I show that for this licensing regime a Nash equilibrium exists. When innovation is drastic, patent holding firm do not license and become a monopoly.

UB_LMU-Logo
MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by
the Munich University Library in Germany.