Brams, Steven J and Kilgour, D. Marc (2010): Satisfaction approval voting.
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We propose a new voting system, satisfaction approval voting (SAV), for multiwinner elections, in which voters can approve of as many candidates or as many parties as they like. However, the winners are not those who receive the most votes, as under approval voting (AV), but those who maximize the sum of the satisfaction scores of all voters, where a voter’s satisfaction score is the fraction of his or her approved candidates who are elected. SAV may give a different outcome from A--in fact, SAV and AV outcomes may be disjoint—but SAV generally chooses candidates representing more diverse interests than does AV (this is demonstrated empirically in the case of a recent election of the Game Theory Society). A decision-theoretic analysis shows that all strategies except approving of a least-preferred candidate are undominated, so voters will often find it optimal to approve of more than one candidate. In party-list systems, SAV apportions seats to parties according to the Jefferson/d’Hondt method with a quota constraint, which favors large parties and gives an incentive to smaller parties to coordinate their policies and forge alliances, even before an election, that reflect their supporters’ coalitional preferences.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Satisfaction approval voting|
|Keywords:||multiwinner election; voting system; approval ballot; proportional representation; apportonment|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C70 - General
|Depositing User:||Steven J. Brams|
|Date Deposited:||17. May 2010 13:40|
|Last Modified:||23. Feb 2013 06:20|
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