Armstrong, Mark and Wright, Julian (2007): Mobile call termination in the UK.
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We discuss policy towards mobile call termination, illustrated by the 2002 Competition Commission enquiry into the UK mobile market. We present a model of the mobile market which includes both fixed-to-mobile and mobile-to-mobile call termination. In broad terms, the former service is likely to involve monopoly pricing if left unchecked, while the latter service---if the termination charge is jointly chosen by networks---may provide the mobile sector with the means by which to relax competition. Competition is often relaxed by choosing a low mobile-to-mobile termination charge. If feasible, then, unregulated networks often wish to set different termination charges depending on whether traffic originates on the fixed or mobile network. By contrast, social optimality often requires that uniform termination charges be imposed.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Institution:||Department of Economics, University College London|
|Original Title:||Mobile call termination in the UK|
|Keywords:||Telecommunications; Regulation; Oligopoly; Call termination|
|Subjects:||L - Industrial Organization > L9 - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities > L96 - Telecommunications
L - Industrial Organization > L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy > L51 - Economics of Regulation
L - Industrial Organization > L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies > L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
|Depositing User:||Mark Armstrong|
|Date Deposited:||21. Mar 2007|
|Last Modified:||18. Feb 2013 06:28|
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