Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część III – Obliczenia cen i zysków dla hipotetycznych danych.

Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część III – Obliczenia cen i zysków dla hipotetycznych danych. Published in: Górnictwo i geologia IX (Mining and geology IX) , Vol. Seria: Studia i Materiały Nr 33 (Series: Studies and Research No.33), No. Prace Naukowe Instytutu Górnictwa Politechniki Wrocławskiej Nr 118 (Scientific Papers of the Institute of Mining of the Wroclaw Univ. of Technology No.118) (23. March 2007): pp. 69-80.

Abstract

For the hypothetical deposit with parameters similar to KWB “Konin” S.A. conditions; lignite prices and proposed divisions are calculated and results were discussed under the angle of the fairness (equity) of the division and the possibility of their approval by both sides. A sensitivity analysis of shares of the mine in joint profits, the level of border prices outlining break-even points, lignite prices, the total profit and the profit of the mine for the price change of the energy, costs of the mine and the power station was carried. Results were discussed under the angle of correction of the division in the next period with taking into consideration the inflation, changes in prices of the energy and level of total costs of the mine and the power station and of the potential temptation of the change in the proportion of shares by increasing expenses. Lignite mines and power stations cooperating with them were invited for discussion about proposed divisions.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Institution: Institute of Mining Engineering at Wroclaw University of Technology
• Language: Polish
• Keywords: Bilateral monopoly; pit optimisation; bargaining; price negotiation; fair division; Nash bargaining solution; Kalai-Smorodinsky solution; lignite; lignite price; lignite mine; lignite power plant; coal price; coal mine; coal power plant
• Subjects: L - Industrial Organization > L0 - General; D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure and Pricing; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory; L - Industrial Organization > L9 - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities > L94 - Electric Utilities; L - Industrial Organization > L7 - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction > L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D89 - Other; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q3 - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation > Q31 - Demand and Supply; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration; Conglomerates; Subsidiaries; D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure and Pricing > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection; L - Industrial Organization > L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies > L42 - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts; R - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics > R3 - Production Analysis and Firm Location > R32 - Other Production and Pricing Analysis; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q4 - Energy > Q42 - Alternative Energy Sources; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L14 - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L10 - General; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q3 - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation > Q32 - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development

References

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