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Opacity of Banks and Runs with Solvency

D'Avino, Carmela and Lucchetta, Marcella (2010): Opacity of Banks and Runs with Solvency.

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Abstract

In absence of bank risk-taking behavior, opacity is defined as the inability of depositors, speculators and central banker to disentangle default risk and asset's return from the asset's value. We show the conditions under which opacity leads to runs on a solvent bank in equilibrium and uncertainty on fundamental values of the asset. The main repercussion of the opacity is, however, on the central bank's policy response which is inefficient during a banking crisis.

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