Farvaque, Etienne (2010): Back to the roots: On the origins of the Fed's independence.
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This note considers the foundations of the Federal Reserve Board's independence. Its origins are shown to reside in the American political philosophy, under which independence is an essential working condition for a perennial democracy.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Back to the roots: On the origins of the Fed's independence|
|Keywords:||Federal Reserve Board, independence, constitution.|
|Subjects:||E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies
N - Economic History > N2 - Financial Markets and Institutions > N20 - General, International, or Comparative
|Depositing User:||Unnamed user with email Etienne.Farvaque@univ-lille1.fr|
|Date Deposited:||02. Aug 2010 11:11|
|Last Modified:||16. Feb 2013 01:00|
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