Breitmoser, Yves (2010): Structural modeling of altruistic giving.
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Abstract
The paper analyzes econometric models of altruistic giving in dictator and public goods games. Using existing data sets, I evaluate internal and external validity of "atheoretic" regression models as well as structural models of random behavior, random coefficients, and random utility, controlling for subject heterogeneity by finite mixture modeling. In dictator games, atheoretic regression lacks external validity, while random coefficient models and random utility models offer high degrees of both internal and external validity. In public goods games, regression works comparably well, being bettered only by random utility models. Overall, the ordered GEV model of random utility is most appropriate to describe choices in the considered games.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  Structural modeling of altruistic giving 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  structural modeling; altruism; dictator game; public goods; ordered choice sets 
Subjects:  C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C5  Econometric Modeling > C50  General C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C4  Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics > C44  Operations Research; Statistical Decision Theory D  Microeconomics > D6  Welfare Economics > D64  Altruism; Philanthropy C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72  Noncooperative Games 
Item ID:  24262 
Depositing User:  Yves Breitmoser 
Date Deposited:  06. Aug 2010 10:05 
Last Modified:  14. Feb 2013 13:14 
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URI:  http://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/24262 
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