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Structural modeling of altruistic giving

Breitmoser, Yves (2010): Structural modeling of altruistic giving.

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Abstract

The paper analyzes econometric models of altruistic giving in dictator and public goods games. Using existing data sets, I evaluate internal and external validity of "atheoretic" regression models as well as structural models of random behavior, random coefficients, and random utility, controlling for subject heterogeneity by finite mixture modeling. In dictator games, atheoretic regression lacks external validity, while random coefficient models and random utility models offer high degrees of both internal and external validity. In public goods games, regression works comparably well, being bettered only by random utility models. Overall, the ordered GEV model of random utility is most appropriate to describe choices in the considered games.

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