Cole, Rebel A. and Fenn, George W. (1996): The role of commercial real estate investments in the banking crisis of 1985-92.
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This article examines the role of commercial real estate investments in the banking crisis of 1985-92, an unprecedented period during which more than 1,300 banks failed. Bank failures are fundamentally important because of the unique role played by financial institutions in the provision of business credit. We discover three striking features of banks failing during this period. First, commercial real estate was only a factor in the bank failures of 1988-92. Second, construction loans played a much larger role in bank failures than permanent loans, and the relationship is strongest with construction loans booked during 1983-1985. Third, other ex ante risk measures are systematically related to banking failure throughout the sample period. These results suggest that risk-seeking banks brought about their own demise and commercial real estate, especially construction lending, was one of the vehicles.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||The role of commercial real estate investments in the banking crisis of 1985-92|
|Keywords:||bank; bank failure; commercial bank; commercial real estate; construction lending; real estate|
|Subjects:||G - Financial Economics > G1 - General Financial Markets > G18 - Government Policy and Regulation
G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G32 - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G28 - Government Policy and Regulation
G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G33 - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G21 - Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
|Depositing User:||Rebel Cole|
|Date Deposited:||30. Aug 2010 00:45|
|Last Modified:||15. Feb 2013 23:26|
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