Mumcu, Ayşe (1999): Strategic Disclosure of Firm-Specific Skills in Wage Bargaining.
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We study the bargaining relationship between a firm and its incumbent worker who possesses firm-specific human capital. We show that the worker's ability to disclose his skills strategically increases his bargaining power. The game may have inefficient equilibria where delays occur in real time. With the addition of outside options for both the firm and the worker, delays are shortened whenever outside options are credible threats. Our model also predicts that wages are procyclical, and there can be a variation in wages for a given job level.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Strategic Disclosure of Firm-Specific Skills in Wage Bargaining|
|Keywords:||bargaining; firm-specific skills|
|Subjects:||C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs > J31 - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
|Depositing User:||Ayşe Mumcu|
|Date Deposited:||03. Apr 2007|
|Last Modified:||14. Feb 2013 01:04|
Available Versions of this Item
Firm-Specific Skills, Wage Bargaining, and Efficiency. (deposited 25. Feb 2007)
- Strategic Disclosure of Firm-Specific Skills in Wage Bargaining. (deposited 03. Apr 2007) [Currently Displayed]