Gupta, Rupayan (2008): The Effect of Opportunity Cost and Pacifism on Protests in Occupied Regions.
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This paper examines how the opportunity costs of the leaders of a national protest movement, and the intrinsic hawkishness or pacifism of the occupier, affect the nature of the movement against occupation. A two-stage game is modeled, in which a protest leader and an external occupier fight over the control of the population of an occupied region. The protest leader can actively convert the populace to protest. On the other hand, the occupier chooses how much to punish the protest leader and other protestors for their actions. The findings of this paper indicate that under certain circumstances leaders who have a greater opportunity cost of leading protests may be more active, compared to leaders with lower opportunity costs. Further, the former may be able to lead a movement with more mass support. This paper also characterizes equilibria, among others, where a more hawkish occupier can actually de-escalate the conflict with the protestors. The characteristics of the population residing in the occupied region, the nature of punishment that is being meted out to the protestors, and the structure of enforcement costs that lead to these outcomes, are discussed in the paper.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||The Effect of Opportunity Cost and Pacifism on Protests in Occupied Regions|
|Keywords:||Conflict; Protest; Revolt|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
H - Public Economics > H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies > H56 - National Security and War
|Depositing User:||Rupayan Gupta|
|Date Deposited:||06. Sep 2010 00:18|
|Last Modified:||25. Feb 2013 08:47|
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The Effect of Opportunity Cost and Pacifism on Protests in Occupied Regions. (deposited 21. Jul 2010 12:46)
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