Breitmoser, Yves (2010): Proto-coalition bargaining and the core.
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In the proto-coalition model of government formation, formateur F appoints a proto-coalition and asks its members whether to start negotiating a coalition contract. If all accept, then the proto-coalition forms and starts negotiating; otherwise a caretaker government assumes office. I extend this model by allowing F to revise the chosen proto-coalition after rejections, that he states pre-conditions for the subsequent negotiations, and that F's opponents may publicly pre-commit to accept/reject certain proposals. The set of equilibrium outcomes is identified as the core if F's opponents can pre-commit and as the convex hull of the core if they cannot pre-commit credibly. This extended model eliminates two flaws of the standard model: it explains why F cannot always install his favored coalition (whatever the status quo) and why "important" coalition members may have more bargaining power in the subsequent negotiations than others.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Proto-coalition bargaining and the core|
|Keywords:||coalition formation, non-cooperative bargaining, core|
|Subjects:||C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games
|Depositing User:||Yves Breitmoser|
|Date Deposited:||15. Sep 2010 01:28|
|Last Modified:||15. Feb 2013 10:22|
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