Michael, Delgado and Neha, Khanna (2010): Voluntary pollution abatement and regulation in the presence of a green market.
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We present a model in which firms voluntarily abate emissions in a market that values environmental quality such that firms can charge a premium for goods that are environmentally friendly. Our results establish conditions under which mandatory abatement crowds out voluntary abatement, or, alternatively, provides an incentive for firms to increase their level of voluntary abatement in order to maintain product differentiation. In addition, we identify cases under which firms that do not abate voluntarily would support mandatory abatement if they are able to collectively pass off (at least part of) the costs of abatement to consumers. Our model predicts that regulatory policies that ignore voluntary abatement are likely to over-regulate non-abating firms compared to the level of regulation that accounts for voluntary abatement if consumer income levels in the green market are relatively high. If consumer income levels in the green market are relatively low, regulation may be ineffective in improving overall environmental quality.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Voluntary pollution abatement and regulation in the presence of a green market|
|Keywords:||Voluntary Pollution Abatement; Regulation; Markup|
|Subjects:||K - Law and Economics > K3 - Other Substantive Areas of Law > K32 - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics > Q52 - Pollution Control Adoption Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics > Q58 - Government Policy
|Depositing User:||Neha Khanna|
|Date Deposited:||15. Sep 2010 15:07|
|Last Modified:||15. Feb 2013 21:42|
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