A human rights approach to the economic analysis of bureaucratic corruption

Ifediora, John (2009): A human rights approach to the economic analysis of bureaucratic corruption. Unpublished.

Abstract

The traditional arena of human rights discourse and practice made little or no allowance for the rapidly growing international phenomenon of bureaucratic corruption.1 In the recent past, states have consistently maintained that bureaucratic corruption, on the basis of the norm of non-intervention, was strictly a domestic issue and thus outside the competence of international bodies2, such as the United Nations. This is no longer the case, for states have now gradually come to grips with the realization that bureaucratic corruption is a debilitating governmental anomaly that admits of no national boundaries, and assaults the social, economic and cultural integrity of all nations, albeit at varying degrees of intensity3. The vast literature on corruption approaches its incidence and effects almost invariably from a political and economic perspective, and rightly conclude that where prevalent, social welfare suffers in terms of anemic economic growth and diminished opportunities4.

A new approach in analyzing the effects of bureaucratic corruption that looks beyond the traditional areas of inquiry is now, more than ever, imperative. It is here argued that the traditional approach is too limited, and fails to recognize the broader social impact of corruption on individuals and collectivities. This work, therefore, adopts a rights-based approach to the analysis of bureaucratic corruption and its effects on fundamental human rights. The thesis here espoused is that bureaucratic corruption, where endemic and sustained, leads to suppressions of human rights through its damaging effects on economic development. It is further posited that when states, cognizant of prevalent corruptive practices, either fail to take preventive measures or tacitly encourage its observance, are derelict in their duties and the obligations assumed as signatories to the United Nations’ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Applied Economics, bureaucratic corruption, human rights
• Subjects: K - Law and Economics > K3 - Other Substantive Areas of Law > K33 - International Law; A - General Economics and Teaching > A1 - General Economics > A13 - Relation of Economics to Social Values; D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure and Pricing

References

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4 ibid. 5 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultutal Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR)

6 JL Graf ‘How Corruption Affects Persistent Capital Flows’ (2003) 4 Economics of Governance 229-243

7 A Shleifer and RW Vishny ‘Corruption’ (1993) 108 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 599-617

8 P Mauro ‘Corruption and the Composition of Government Expenditure’(1995) 69 Journal of Public Economics 263-279

9 D Osterfeld Prosperity Versus Planning: How Government Stifles Economic Growth ( Oxford University Press Oxford 1992) 10 ibid

11 See H Steiner and P Alston International Human Rights in Context Law, Politics, Morals (Clarendon Press Oxford 1996) 212

12 S Wei and A Schleifer ‘Local Corruption and Global Capital Flows’ (2000) 2 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity Vol 2000 303-354

13 ibid.

14 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Official in International Business ( adopted in February 1999) OECD< http://www.oecd.org > (15 August 2004) 15 Fighting Corruption to Improve Good Governance UNDP (adopted 1999)

16 UNGA Res 51/191 (1996) 17 UNGA Res 51/59 (1996)

18 UNGA Res 52/87 (1997) 19 UNGA Res 54/4 (2003)

20 UNGA Res 54/4 (2003) 21 Statement made by UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, on the adoption of the UN Convention Against Corruption. See< http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crime_convention_corruption.html > (2 October 2003)

22 P Mauro ‘Corruption And Growth’ (1995) 110 The Quarterly Journal of Economics, CVI 681-711 23 R Binayak ‘Can Development Survive Corruption?’ (1996) Contemporary Economic Policy Vol 25 Issue 3 36-42

24 A Morgan Corruption: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Implications (The Asian Foundation, San Fransisco, 1998) 11-13

25 A Morgan Corruption: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Implications (The Asian Foundation, San Fransisco, 1998) 13-17

26 S Bragnuinsky ‘Corruption and Schumpeterian Growth in Different Economic Environment’ (1996) Contemporary Economic Policy Vol 14 Issue 3 14-26 27 S Alatas Corruption: Its Nature, Causes and Functions (Aldershot, Avebury, 1990) 100-117

28 S Rose-Ackerman Corruption: A Study in Political Economy (Academic Press New York 1978) 7 29 C Scott ‘The Interdependence And Permeability of Human Rights Norms: Towards a Partial Fusion of The International Covenants on Human Rights’ (1989) 27 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 769

30 ibid

31 R Afshari ‘An Essay on Islamic Cultural Relativism in the Discourse of Human Rights’ (1994) 16 Human Rights Quarterly 235-276

32 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR).

33 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultutal Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR).

34 R Kunnemann ‘A Coherent Approach to Human Rights’ (1995) 17 Human Rights Quarterly 323-342

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37 C Scott ‘The Interdependence And Permeability of Human Rights Norms: Towards a Partial Fusion of The International Covenants on Human Rights’ (1989) 27 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 769 - 798

38 ibid.

39 Limburg Principles UN Doc E/Cn.4/1987/17/Annex 40 Maastricht Guidelines UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/13 41 R Kunnemann ‘A Coherent Approach to Human Rights’ (1995) 17 Human Rights Quarterly 323-342 42 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultutal Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR)

43 Limburg Principles UN Doc E/Cn.4/1987/17/Annex

44 ibid.

45 ibid.

46 Homogeneous Oligopoly is a market structure in which a standardized product or service is produced in an industry dominated by a few large firms.

47 A Shleifer and W Vishny ‘Corruption’ (1993) The Quarterly Journal of Economics CVI 559-617

48 An oligopolistic market maybe one characterized by the presence of a standard product, such as the steel industry, or one with diversified products, such as the car industry 49 A Krueger ‘The Political Economy of a Rent-Seeking Society’ (1974) LXIV American Economic Review 291-303

50 The prisoner’s Dilemma is a story commonly used by Economists to illustrate an efficient outcome in an oligopolistic market setting. See J Ifediora Price Theory: An Economic Analysis of Markets (Ginn Press Boston MA 1996) 230-235

51 C Bicchieri and C Rovelli ‘The Dynamics of Corruption’ (1995) 7 Rationality And Society 201-224

52 ibid

53 Marginal Cost or MC is the additional cost of producing an extra unit of a commodity or, in the case of services, the additional cost of generating the same service again. See J Ifediora Price Theory: An Economic Analysis of Markets (Ginn Press Boston MA 1996) 108-110

54 ibid 230

55 The standard economic analysis of monopoly as a market model is that a profit-maximizing monopolist would has the option to set the price of its services and the forces of supply and demand would determine the quantity it can expect to sell at that price. However, the price it sets for its services would generally be higher than what would prevail in competitive markets because, as a monopolist, there are no reasonable substitutes for its services. See M Lieberman and J Ifediora Microeconomics (Thomson Learning Publishing Mason OH 2004) 261-284

56 Under a market model of Perfect Competition, market participants are called price-takers because they have no influence over prices, and thus accept the prices already established by the forces of supply and demand. See M Lieberman and J Ifediora Microeconomics (Thomson Learning Publishing Mason OH 2004) 237-258

57 Non-collusive Oligopolies are characterized by competition as opposed to Collusive Oligopolies that collude to set prices and output. See J Ifediora Price Theory: An Economic Analysis of Markets (Ginn Press Boston MA 1996) 215-232

58 ibid

59 A Ledeneva An Economy of Favors: Informal Exchanges and Networking in Russia (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 1998)

60 S Rose-Ackerman Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 1999) 10

61 World Bank Anticorruption in Transition: A Contribution to the Policy Debate (The World Bank Washington DC 2000) 62 Transparency International ‘National Integrity Systems’ <http://www.transparency.de/sourcebook/Part_A/Chapter_2.html > (10 September 2004).

63 Lansman et al v Finland (1995) UN Human Rights Committee Communication No 671/1995 UN Doc CCPR/c/58/D/671/1995. 64 C Ledivina Bureaucratic Corruption in Asia: Causes, Consequences, and Controls (JMC Press Quezon City The Philippines 1986) 65 D Hernando The Other Path (Harper and Row New York 1989) 66 R Klitgaard Tropical Gangsters (Basic Books New York 1990) 67 ibid 68 A Shleifer and R Vishny ‘Pervasives Shortages under Socialism’ (1992) XXIII Rand Journal of Economics 237-246

69 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultutal Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR)

70 ibid. 71 Maastricht Guidelines UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/13 72 UN Development Programme’s Website <http://www.undp.org > (20 October 2004)

73 See Green Peace <htt://www.archive.greenpeace.org/comms/ken/murder.html> (5 September 2004) 74 These are well documented at this UN Website <http://www.unpo.org/news > (25 September 2004)

75 See Green Peace <htt://www.archive.greenpeace.org/comms/ken/murder.html> (5 September 2004) 76 ibid. 77 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultutal Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR)

78 See H Steiner and P Alston International Human Rights in Context Law, Politics, Morals (Clarendon Press Oxford 1996) 212

79 J O’Monique ‘Development, Human Rights and Law’ (1992) 3 Human Rights Quarterly 372