Optimal State-Contingent Unemployment Insurance

Sanchez, Juan M. (2006): Optimal State-Contingent Unemployment Insurance. Unpublished.

Abstract

Since the probability of finding a job is affected not only by individual effort but also by the aggregate state of the economy, designing unemployment insurance payments conditional on the business cycle could be valuable. This paper answers a fundamental question related to this issue: How should the payments vary with the aggregate state of the economy?

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Unemployment Insurance; Aggregate Fluctuations; Recursive Contracts and Moral Hazard
• Subjects: J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies > J68 - Public Policy; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis; J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies > J65 - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances

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