A Single-Mindedness model with n generations

Emanuele, Canegrati (2007): A Single-Mindedness model with n generations. Unpublished.

Abstract

In this paper I will analyse the redistribution of income amongst n generations using the Single-mindedness Theory. I will introduce a new expression for the balanced-budget constraint, no longer based on lump- sum transfers as in the traditional literature, but rather on more realistic labour income taxation. Since the Government has to clear the budget, some generations obtain a benefit, whilst some other must pay the entire cost of social secutiry systems. I will demonstrate that generations which are more single-minded on leisure are the most better off since they are more able to capture politicians in the political competition. Further- more, it could be the case that candidates are not forced to undertake the same policies in equilibrium and I will demonstrate that this result holds only once an endogenous density function for individual preferences for politicians is considered.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Additional Information: preliminary version: please do not quote.
• Institution: Catholic University of Sacred Heart
• Language: English
• Keywords: income distribution; probabilistic voting models; Single-mindedness; overlapping generations
• Subjects: H - Public Economics > H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies > H50 - General; D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement; H - Public Economics > H6 - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt > H61 - Budget; Budget Systems; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior; I - Health, Education, and Welfare > I3 - Welfare and Poverty > I38 - Government Policy; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs; H - Public Economics > H1 - Structure and Scope of Government > H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government; H - Public Economics > H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies > H55 - Social Security and Public Pensions; D - Microeconomics > D3 - Distribution > D31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions; H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H24 - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies; J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J1 - Demographic Economics > J13 - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth; D - Microeconomics > D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics > D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory; D - Microeconomics > D3 - Distribution > D30 - General; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games; H - Public Economics > H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies > H53 - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs; H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H23 - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies; J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J2 - Time Allocation, Work Behavior, and Employment Determination and Creation; Human Capital; Retirement > J26 - Retirement; Retirement Policies; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations; H - Public Economics > H3 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents > H31 - Household; J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J2 - Time Allocation, Work Behavior, and Employment Determination and Creation; Human Capital; Retirement; H - Public Economics > H6 - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt > H60 - General; J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J2 - Time Allocation, Work Behavior, and Employment Determination and Creation; Human Capital; Retirement > J22 - Time Allocation and Labor Supply; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances

References

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