Alliance Partner Choice in Markets with Vertical and Horizontal Externalities

Hattori, Keisuke and Lin, Ming Hsin (2010): Alliance Partner Choice in Markets with Vertical and Horizontal Externalities.

Abstract

This study investigates the choice between complementary and parallel alliances in a market with vertical and horizontal externalities. One composite goods firm competes with two components producers, each providing a complementary component of a differentiated com- posite good. Although the joint profits from a parallel alliance between the composite goods firm and a components producer are always larger than those from a complementary alliance between components producers, through Nash bargaining, a components producer prefers the complementary (parallel) alliance when the degree of product differentiation is sufficiently large (small). Combined with the result that a complementary alliance is socially preferable, our findings provide meaningful implications for antitrust policy.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Complementary alliance; Parallel alliance; Nash bargaining; Antitrust policy
• Subjects: L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets; L - Industrial Organization > L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies > L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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