Rosellon, Juan and Tregear, Juan and Zenon, Eric (2010): El modelo HRV para expansión óptima de redes de transmisión: una aplicación a la red eléctrica de Ontario.
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This paper presents an application of a mechanism that provides incentives to promote transmission network expansion in the electricity system of the Ontario province. Such a mechanism combines a merchant approach with a regulatory approach. It is based on the rebalancing of a two-part tariff within the framework of a wholesale electricity market with nodal pricing. The expansion of the network is carried out through auctions of financial transmission rights for congested links. The mechanism is tested for a simplified transmission grid with ten interconnected zones, ten nodes, eleven lines and seventy eight generators in the Ontario province. The simulation is carried out for both peak and non-peak scenarios. Considering Laspeyres weights, the results show that that prices converge to the marginal cost of generation, the congestion rent decreases, and the total social welfare increases.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||El modelo HRV para expansión óptima de redes de transmisión: una aplicación a la red eléctrica de Ontario|
|English Title:||The HRV Model for the Optimal Expansion of Transmission Networks: an Application to the Ontario Electricity Grid|
|Keywords:||Keywords: Electricity transmission, financial transmission rights (FTRs), incentive regulation, loop-flow problem, nodal prices, Ontario|
|Subjects:||L - Industrial Organization > L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy > L51 - Economics of Regulation
L - Industrial Organization > L9 - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities > L91 - Transportation: General
L - Industrial Organization > L9 - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities > L94 - Electric Utilities
Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q4 - Energy > Q40 - General
|Depositing User:||Juan Rosellon|
|Date Deposited:||06. Nov 2010 08:20|
|Last Modified:||15. Feb 2013 19:34|
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