Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Central bank communication: fragmentation as an engine for limiting the publicity degree of information

Trabelsi, Emna (2010): Central bank communication: fragmentation as an engine for limiting the publicity degree of information.

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Abstract

In earlier theoretical framework, Morris and Shin (2002) highlight the potential dangers of transparency policy. In particular, public announcements may be detrimental to social welfare. Later, Morris and Shin (2005) uphold that more precise communication can degrade the signal value of prices. Researchers suggest reducing the precision of public information or withholding it. Cornand and Heinemann (2008) suggest rather limiting the publicity degree. We found that the same effect can be reached by establishing fragmented public information, but in presence of private signal.

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