Kratzsch, Uwe and Sieg, Gernot and Stegemann, Ulrike (2010): A full participation agreement on global emission reduction through strategic investments in R & D.
Download (357kB) | Preview
If an emission reduction agreement with participation of all players is not enforceable because politicians are too myopic or not able to commit themselves to sustainable policies or costs of reducing emis- sions are too high, strategic investments in research and development (R&D) of green technology, for example sustainable drive-trains, can pave the way for a future treaty. Although no player will rationally reduce emissions on its own, investments in R&D by at least one player can change the strategic situation of negotiations to control emissions: Emission abatement costs will decrease so that a treaty with full par- ticipation can be achieved in future periods through time consistent sustainable policies.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||A full participation agreement on global emission reduction through strategic investments in R & D.|
|Keywords:||emissions; discount factor; commitment; endogenous technical change; repeated prisoner’s dilemma|
|Subjects:||O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Innovation ; Research and Development ; Technological Change ; Intellectual Property Rights > O30 - General
H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods > H41 - Public Goods
F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy > F53 - International Agreements and Observance ; International Organizations
Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics > Q54 - Climate ; Natural Disasters and Their Management ; Global Warming
|Depositing User:||Gernot Sieg|
|Date Deposited:||03. Dec 2010 20:43|
|Last Modified:||19. May 2015 00:17|
Asheim, G.B., C.B. Froyn, J. Hovi and F.C. Menz, 2006, Regional versus global cooperation on climate control, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 51(1), 93-109.
Asheim, G.B. and B. Holtsmark, 2009, Renegotiation-Proof Climate Agree- ments with Full Participation: Conditions for Pareto-Efficiency, Environ- mental and Resource Economics 43(4), 519-533.
Barrett, S., 1999, A Theory of Full International Cooperation, Journal of Theoretical Politics 11(4), 519-541.
Barrett, S., 2002, Consensus Treaties, Journal of Institutional and Theo- retical Economics 158(4), 529-547.
Carraro, C., Siniscalco, D., 1993. Strategies for the international protec- tion of the environment. Journal of Public Economics 52(3), 309-328.
Froyn, C.B. and J. Hovi, 2008, A climate agreement with full participa- tion, Economics Letters 99, 317-319.
Sinn, H.-W., 2008, Public policies against global warming: a supply side approach, International Tax and Public Finance 15, 360-394.