Muravyev, Alexander (2003): Обновление директорского корпуса на российских приватизированных предприятиях. Published in: Russian Management Journal (Rossiiskii Zhurnal Menedzhmenta) , Vol. 1, No. 1 (2003): pp. 77-90.
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This article is one of the first surveys on the turnover of senior managers in privatized enterprises in Russia. Its basic premise is that a radical change in the managing teams of these enterprises was necessary in the 1990s in order to enhance their restructuring and improve their performance. The article discusses the economic mechanisms that underlie managerial turnover in the developed economies and draws attention to the specifics of the transition economy of Russia that decreased its intensity. The determinants of managerial succession are discussed in a separate section. A review of empirical evidence on the managerial turnover in Russia indicates a low speed of this process, especially at the start of the transition period. At the same time there are signs that the turnover has been governed by the same forces as in the developed economies. In particular, there is a link between the replacement of managers and their performance. The strength of this relationship determines the quality of enterprise management and governance to a large extent; further improvements in this field require a greater transparency of companies and better protection of property rights.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Обновление директорского корпуса на российских приватизированных предприятиях|
|English Title:||Turnover of managers in Russian privatized enterprises: A survey of evidence|
|Keywords:||Managerial turnover, corporate governance, Russia.|
|Subjects:||G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance|
|Depositing User:||Alexander Muravyev|
|Date Deposited:||12. Dec 2010 17:35|
|Last Modified:||14. Feb 2013 10:00|
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