Munich Personal RePEc Archive

A theory of dynamic tariff and quota retaliation

Naqvi, Nadeem (2010): A theory of dynamic tariff and quota retaliation.

[img]
Preview
PDF
MPRA_paper_27656.pdf

Download (795kB) | Preview

Abstract

This paper establishes relationships between static Nash equilibria and dynamic Markov perfect equilibria of tariff and quota retaliation games. In supermodular games where tariffs are strategic complements, the steady state of every, symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium must have lower tariffs than in the static equilibrium. If tariffs are strategic substitutes, tariffs in the dynamic game are higher than in the static equilibrium. The supermodular case is extended to quota competition. Instead of the well-known non-equivalence between tariff and quota retaliation outcomes under complete myopia, in some circumstances, free trade can be supported in the steady state of a Markov perfect equilibrium, regardless of whether policies employed are quotas or tariffs. We reach the conclusion that the effect of introducing dynamics crucially depends on whether the policy instruments employed by the countries are strategic substitutes or complements irrespective of whether they are tariffs or quotas.

UB_LMU-Logo
MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by
the Munich University Library in Germany.