Al-Ubaydli, Omar and Jones, Garett and Weel, Jaap (2010): Patience, cognitive skill and coordination in the repeated stag hunt.
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Coordination games have become a critical tool of analysis in fields such as development and institutional economics. Understanding behavior in coordination games is an important step towards understanding the differing success of teams, firms and nations. This paper investigates the relationship between personal attributes (cognitive ability, risk-aversion, patience) and behavior and outcomes in coordination games, an issue that, to the best of our knowledge, has never been studied before. For the repeated coordination game that we consider, we find that: (1) cognitive ability has no bearing on any aspect of behavior or outcomes; (2) pairs of players who are more patient are more likely to coordinate well and earn higher payoffs; and (3) risk-aversion has no bearing on any aspect of behavior or outcomes. These results are robust to controlling for personality traits and demographic characteristics.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Patience, cognitive skill and coordination in the repeated stag hunt|
|Keywords:||Coordination; IQ; personality; discount rate; patience; risk-aversion|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
O - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O12 - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
|Depositing User:||Omar Al-Ubaydli|
|Date Deposited:||29. Dec 2010 20:33|
|Last Modified:||13. Feb 2013 08:12|
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