Lombardi, Michele (2010): Two-agent Nash implementation with partially-honest agents: Almost Full Characterizations.
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In a two-agent society with partially-honest agents, we extend Dutta and Sen (2009)'s results of Nash implementation to the domain of weak orders. We identify the class of Nash implementable social choice correspondences with a "gap" between necessary and sufficient conditions, both when exactly one agent is partially-honest and when both agents are partially-honest. We also show that, on the domain of linear orders, the "gap" between our conditions gets closed and they become equivalent to those devised by Dutta and Sen. New implementing mechanisms are devised. In line with earlier works, the classic condition of monotonicity is no longer required, whereas a weak version of the standard punishment condition is required even when both agents are known to be partially-honest. We derive simpler sufficient conditions that are satisfied in a wide range of applications.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Two-agent Nash implementation with partially-honest agents: Almost Full Characterizations|
|Keywords:||Two-agent Nash implementation, intrinsic preferences for honesty, permissive results|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games
|Depositing User:||Michele Lombardi|
|Date Deposited:||02. Jan 2011 19:09|
|Last Modified:||12. Feb 2013 05:27|
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