Knack, Stephen (2004): Empowerment as a zero-sum game. Published in: Measuring empowerment: cross-disciplinary perspectives , Vol. edited, (2005): pp. 365-382.
Download (365kB) | Preview
Empowerment of the poor does not necessarily make them better off – or make the non-poor worse off. In some cases, empowerment may be inefficient, i.e. a negative-sum game. In other cases, it is a zero-sum game, as the poor can benefit only at the expense of someone else. But in many cases, it can be positive-sum, and these opportunities should be identified and pursued by reformers. Attempts by donor organizations and NGOs to empower the poor should focus on means by which the poor are likely to be made better off without making others worse off. Not only is this approach consistent with efficiency, it will also often be the only politically feasible way to empower the poor.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Empowerment as a zero-sum game|
|Keywords:||empowerment, development, poverty, inequality, institutinoal development, democracy|
|Subjects:||O - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth > O4 - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity > O43 - Institutions and Growth
P - Economic Systems > P1 - Capitalist Systems > P16 - Political Economy
|Depositing User:||Stephen Knack|
|Date Deposited:||18. Jan 2011 07:53|
|Last Modified:||16. Feb 2013 11:49|
Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson (2000). “Why Did the West Extend the Franchise?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115:1167-99.
Banfield, Edward C. (1958). The Moral Basis of a Backward Society. Chicago: The Free Press.
Barro, Robert (1991). “Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 407-33.
Besley, Tim and Robin Burgess (2003). “The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence From India.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, forthcoming.
Boix, Carles and Daniel N. Posner (1998). “Social Capital: Explaining its Origins and Effects on Government Behavior.” British Journal of Political Science 28(4):686-93.
de Soto, Hernando (1989). The Other Path: the Invisible Revolution in the Third World. New York: Harper and Row.
Deininger, Klaus and Lyn Squire (1996). “A New Data Set: Measuring Income Inequality.” World Bank Economic Review, 10, 565-92.
Easterly, William and Stanley Fischer (2001). “Inflation and the Poor.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 33, 160-78.
Feder, Gershon; Tongroj Onchan, Yongyuth Chalamwong and Chira Hongladarom (1988). Land Policies and Farm Productivity in Thailand. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Gugerty, Mary Kay, and Michael Kremer (2002). “The Impact of Development Assistance on Social Capital: Evidence From Kenya.” In C. Grootaert and T. van Bastelaer, eds., The Role of Social Capital in Development: An Empirical Assessment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hill, Kim Quaile and Jan E. Leighley (1992). “The Policy Consequences of Class Bias in State Electorates.” American Journal of Political Science, 36(2): 351-65.
Kaufmann, Daniel; Aart Kraay and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton (1999). “Aggregating Governance Indicators.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2196.
Kaufmann, Dani; Pablo Zoido-Lobaton and Young Lee (2000). “Governance and Anticorruption Diagnostic Study for Ecuador.” World Bank (unpublished manuscript).
Keefer, Philip (2002). “Clientilism, Credibility and Democracy.” Unpublished paper, The World Bank.
Keefer, Philip and Stuti Khemani (2003). “Democracy, Public Expenditures and the Poor.” Background paper for World Development Report 2004, World Bank.
Knack, Stephen (2002a). “Social Capital, Growth and Poverty.” In C. Grootaert and T. van Bastelaer, eds., The Role of Social Capital in Development: An Empirical Assessment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Knack, Stephen (2002b). “Social Capital and the Quality of Government: Evidence From the U.S. States.” American Journal of Political Science, 46(4), 772-85.
Knack, Stephen and Philip Keefer (1995). "Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures." Economics and Politics, 7, November 1995, 207-227.
Mauro, Paolo (1998). “Corruption and Growth.” Journal of Public Economics, 110, 681-712.
North, Douglas (1991). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Olson, Mancur (1994). “Who Gains From Policies that Increase Poverty?” IRIS Center Working Paper #137. Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector, Univewrsity of Maryland College Park.
Putnam, Robert with Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Y. Nanetti (1993). Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Squire, Lyn (1993). “Fighting Poverty.” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 83(2), 377-82.
Stromberg, David (2001). “Radio’s Impact on New Deal Spending.” Unpublished paper, Princeton University.
Summers, Robert and Alan Heston (1991). “The Penn World Tables (Mark V): An Extended Set of International Comparisons, 1950-88.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 327-68.
Swamy, Anand; Stephen Knack, Young Lee and Omar Azfar (2001). “Gender and Corruption.” Journal of Development Economics, 64: 25-55.
Narayan, Deepa, ed. (2002). Empowerment and Poverty Reduction: A Sourcebook. The World Bank.
Verba, Sidney and Norman H. Nie (1972). Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality. Chicago: Uiniversity of Chicago Press.
World Bank (2000). World Development Report 2000. Washington DC: World Bank.