Berdellima, Arian and Naqvi, Nadeem (2011): Existence of a Pareto optimal social interaction outcome with non-binary preferences.
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We prove the existence of a Pareto optimal state of a society with non-binary personal preferences. To our knowledge, this is the weakest set of conditions under which the existence of a Pareto optimal state has been proven. In our theory everybody in society engages in maximization as a personal act of volitional choice based on non-binary preferences, as in Sen (1997). The resultant equilibrium belongs to a unanimity-based nonempty social maximal set. Our generalization exposes the fact that such equilibria support discrimination, which is a surprising, though serious, indictment of relying exclusively on the Pareto principle in social evaluation.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Existence of a Pareto optimal social interaction outcome with non-binary preferences|
|Keywords:||Non-binary choice; Non-binary preferences; Maximization; Pareto optimality|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D60 - General
|Depositing User:||Nadeem Naqvi|
|Date Deposited:||19. Jan 2011 12:35|
|Last Modified:||12. Feb 2013 14:13|
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Naqvi, Nadeem. On Non-binary Personal Preferences in Society, Economic Theory and Racial Discrimination, 2010, MPRA Paper No. 21522, Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/21522/ .