Billand, Pascal and Bravard, Christophe and Chakrabarti, Subhadip and Sarangi, Sudipta (2010): Networks of Collaboration in Multi-market Oligopolies.
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The result that firms competing in a Cournot oligopoly with pairwise collaboration form a complete network under zero or negligible link formation costs provided by Goyal and Joshi (2003) no longer hold in multi-market oligopolies. Link formation in one market aﬀects a firm’s profitability in another market in a possibly negative way resulting in the fact that it is no longer always profitable in an unambiguous manner. With non-negative link formation costs, the stable networks have a dominant group architecture and eﬃcient networks are charecterized by at most one non-singleton component with a geodesic distance between players that is less than three.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Networks of Collaboration in Multi-market Oligopolies|
|Keywords:||networks, collaboration, R & D|
|Subjects:||L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L20 - General
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C70 - General
|Depositing User:||Subhadip Chakrabarti|
|Date Deposited:||18. Jan 2011 20:17|
|Last Modified:||13. Feb 2013 07:19|
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