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Re-Reforming the Bostonian System: A Novel Approach to the Schooling Problem

Alcalde, Jose and Romero-Medina, Antonio (2011): Re-Reforming the Bostonian System: A Novel Approach to the Schooling Problem.

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Abstract

This paper proposes the notion of E-stability to conciliate Pareto efficiency and fairness. We propose the use of a centralized procedure, the Exchanging Places Mechanism. It endows students a position according with the Gale and Shapley students optimal stable matching as tentative allocation and allows the student to trade their positions. We show that the final allocation is E-stable, i.e. efficient, fair and immune to any justifiable objection that students can formulate.

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