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Ressource non renouvelable polluante : décentralisation de l'optimum en présence d'un pouvoir de marché

Belgodere, Antoine (2007): Ressource non renouvelable polluante : décentralisation de l'optimum en présence d'un pouvoir de marché.

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Abstract

In this paper, I study the strategic interactions between a country that owns a monopoly on a polluting non renewable resource (basically, the OPEC), and a representative of countries that both consume the resource and are hurt by its pollution. Both pollution control and rent captation are at stake in this model.

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