Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Login | Create Account

Ressource non renouvelable polluante : décentralisation de l'optimum en présence d'un pouvoir de marché

Belgodere, Antoine (2007): Ressource non renouvelable polluante : décentralisation de l'optimum en présence d'un pouvoir de marché. Unpublished.

[img]
Preview
PDF - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader
891Kb

Abstract

In this paper, I study the strategic interactions between a country that owns a monopoly on a polluting non renewable resource (basically, the OPEC), and a representative of countries that both consume the resource and are hurt by its pollution. Both pollution control and rent captation are at stake in this model.

Item Type:MPRA Paper
English Title:Polluting nonrenewable resources: decentralization of the optimum in the presence of market power
Language:French
Keywords:nonrenewable resources ; stok pollution ; differetial games
Subjects:Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q3 - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation
H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H23 - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics > Q54 - Climate; Natural Disasters
ID Code:28278
Deposited By:Antoine Belgodere
Deposited On:20. Jan 2011 15:19
Last Modified:20. Jan 2011 15:19
References:

Amundsen, E. & Schob, R. (1999), 'Environmental taxes on exhaustible resources', European Journal of Political Economy 15(2), 311-329.

Grimaud, A. & Rougé, L. (2005), 'Polluting non-renewable resources, innovation and growth : Welfare and environmental policy', Resource and Energy Economics 27(2), 109-129.

Schou, P. (2000), 'Polluting non-renewable resources and growth', Environmental and Resource Economics 16(2), 211-227.

Schou, P. (2002), 'When environmental policy is superuous : Growth and polluting resources', Scandinavian Journal of Economics 104(4), 605-620.

Sinclair, P. (1992), 'High does nothing and rising is worse : Carbon taxes should be kept declining to cut harmful emissions', Manchester School 60, 41-52.

Sinclair, P. (1994), 'On the optimum trend of fossil fuel taxation', Oxford Economic Papers 46, 869-877.

Stiglitz, J. (1976), 'Monopoly and the rate of extraction of exhaustible resources', American Economic Review 66(4), 655-661.

Ulph, A. & Ulph, D. (1994), 'The optimal path of a carbon tax', Oxford Economic Papers 46, 857-868.

Repository Staff Only: item control page

LMU-Logo
MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by
the Munich University Library in Germany.