Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Multiplicative uncertainty, central bank transparency and optimal degree of conservativeness

Dai, Meixing (2010): Multiplicative uncertainty, central bank transparency and optimal degree of conservativeness. Published in: Economics Bulletin , Vol. Vol. 3, No. no.3 (6. July 2010): pp. 1720-1726.

[img]
Preview
PDF
MPRA_paper_28548.pdf

Download (206Kb) | Preview

Abstract

This paper extends the results of Kobayashi (2003) and Ciccarone and Marchetti (2009) by considering the optimal choice of central bank conservativeness. It is shown that the government can choose a sufficiently populist but opaque central banker so that higher multiplicative uncertainty improves the social welfare only when the society is very conservative.

UB_LMU-Logo
MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by
the Munich University Library in Germany.