The Average Tree Solution for Multi-choice Forest Games

Béal, Sylvain; Lardon, Aymeric; Rémila, Eric and Solal, Philippe (2011): The Average Tree Solution for Multi-choice Forest Games. Unpublished.

Abstract

In this article we study cooperative multi-choice games with limited cooperation possibilities, represented by an undirected forest on the player set. Players in the game can cooperate if they are connected in the forest. We introduce a new (single-valued) solution concept which is a generalization of the average tree solution defined and characterized by Herings et al. [2008] for TU-games played on a forest. Our solution is characterized by component efficiency, component fairness and independence on the greatest activity level. It belongs to the precore of a restricted multi-choice game whenever the underlying multi-choice game is superadditive and isotone. We also link our solution with the hierarchical outcomes (Demange, 2004) of some particular TU-games played on trees. Finally, we propose two possible economic applications of our average tree solution.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Average tree solution; Communication graph; (pre-)Core; Hierarchical outcomes; Multi-choice games.
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games

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