Lombardi, Michele and Yoshihara, Naoki (2011): Partiallyhonest Nash implementation: Characterization results.

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Abstract
This paper studies implementation problems in the wake of a recent new trend of implementation theory which incorporates a nonconsequentialist flavor of the evidence from experimental and behavioral economics into the issues. Specifically, following the seminal works by Matsushima (2008) and Dutta and Sen (2009), the paper considers implementation problems with partially honest agents, which presume that there exists at least one individual in the society who concerns herself with not only outcomes but also honest behavior at least in a limited manner. Given this setting, the paper provides a general characterization of Nash implementation with partiallyhonest individuals. It also provides the necessary and sufficient condition for Nash implementation with partiallyhonest individuals by mechanisms with some types of strategyspace reductions. As a consequence, it shows that, in contrast to the case of the standard framework, the equivalence between Nash implementation and Nash implementation with strategy space reduction no longer holds.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  Partiallyhonest Nash implementation: Characterization results 
English Title:  Partiallyhonest Nash implementation: Characterization results 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  Nash implementation, canonicalmechanisms, smechanisms, selfrelevant mechanisms, partialhonesty, permissive results. 
Subjects:  D  Microeconomics > D0  General > D03  Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles D  Microeconomics > D7  Analysis of Collective DecisionMaking > D71  Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72  Noncooperative Games 
Item ID:  28838 
Depositing User:  Michele Lombardi 
Date Deposited:  17. Feb 2011 18:21 
Last Modified:  21. Feb 2013 08:42 
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URI:  http://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/28838 