Reito, Francesco (2011): When Opposites Attract: Is the Assortative Matching Always Positive?
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This paper shows that the positive assortative matching of Ghatak (1999) and Van Tassel (1999) is not a general result and always depends on the distribution of safe and risky types. Some new implications are: (i) borrowers may be better off by forming mixed groups. (ii) a mixed pooling equilibrium is possible when homogeneous pooling equilibria do not exist, and even when the reservation income of borrowers is equal to zero.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||When Opposites Attract: Is the Assortative Matching Always Positive?|
|Keywords:||joint liability lending; assortative matching; screening|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G20 - General
O - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O12 - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
|Depositing User:||Francesco Reito|
|Date Deposited:||22. Feb 2011 20:59|
|Last Modified:||15. Feb 2013 11:06|