Casting the naturalization of asylum seekers as an economic problem

Stark, Oded (2010): Casting the naturalization of asylum seekers as an economic problem. Published in: Economics Letters , Vol. 108, No. 3 (2010): pp. 286-290.

Abstract

The asylum seekers who choose the level of investment in the host-country-specific human capital, and the government of the host country that chooses the probability of naturalization are modeled as optimizing economic agents in a setting not of their choosing.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: The probability of naturalization; Investment in host-country-specific human capital; Economic behavior of asylum seekers; Economic behavior of the government of the host country; Stackelberg game
• Subjects: F - International Economics > F2 - International Factor Movements and International Business > F20 - General; J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J4 - Particular Labor Markets > J41 - Labor Contracts; A - General Economics and Teaching > A1 - General Economics > A13 - Relation of Economics to Social Values; J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies > J61 - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers; J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J2 - Demand and Supply of Labor > J24 - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity

References

Facchini, G., Lorz, O., Willmann, G., 2006. Asylum seekers in Europe: the warm glow of a hot potato. Journal of Population Economics 19, 411-430.

Hatton, T.J., 2004. Seeking asylum in Europe. Economic Policy 19, 5-62.

Mariani, F., 2007. The political economy of immigrants’ naturalization. European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Working Paper 2007/02.

Ortega, F., 2005. Immigration quotas and skill upgrading. Journal of Public Economics 89, 1841-1863.