Martorana, Marco Ferdinando and Mazza, Isidoro (2010): Satisfaction and adaptation in voting behavior: an empirical exploration. Published in: working paper - DEMQ - University of Catania (2011)
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Dynamic models of learning and adaptation have provided realistic predictions in terms of voting behavior. This study aims at contributing to their scant empirical verification. We develop a learning algorithm based on bounded rationality estimating the pattern of learning process through a two-stage econometric model. The analysis links voting behavior to past choices and economic satisfaction derived from previous period election and state of the economy. This represents a novelty in the literature on voting that assumes given voter preferences. Results show that persistence is positively affected by the combination of income changes and past behavior and by union membership.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Satisfaction and adaptation in voting behavior: an empirical exploration|
|Keywords:||voting; bounded rationality; learning; political accountability|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C2 - Single Equation Models; Single Variables > C23 - Models with Panel Data; Longitudinal Data; Spatial Time Series
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C2 - Single Equation Models; Single Variables > C25 - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions
|Depositing User:||Marco Ferdinando Martorana|
|Date Deposited:||08. Mar 2011 00:54|
|Last Modified:||19. Feb 2013 03:39|
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