Liu, Tao-Xiong and Hu, An-Gang and Zhou, Bi-Hua (2011): Defense Expenditure and Economic Growth under External Predation.
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This paper develops a growth model of a country under a Hobbesian environment with international conflicts where national defense is the only way to prevent external predation. The long run growth path is determined by the equilibrium of a dynamic game with three players, the external predator, the government and the family. The equilibrium growth path has three phases, submissive equilibrium, tolerant equilibrium and full-protected equilibrium. Different defense strategies result in different growth prospects and sustainable growth will endogenously induce adjustment of defense strategies.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Defense Expenditure and Economic Growth under External Predation|
|English Title:||Defense Expenditure and Economic Growth under External Predation|
|Keywords:||economic growth; predate; defense expenditure|
|Subjects:||F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations and International Political Economy > F51 - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, Macroeconomic Policy, and General Outlook > E60 - General
|Depositing User:||TaoXiong Liu|
|Date Deposited:||06. Mar 2011 15:50|
|Last Modified:||20. Feb 2013 07:54|
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