Yamamura, Eiji and Kondoh, Haruo (2011): Government transparency and expenditure in the rent-seeking industry: the case of Japan for 1998-2004.
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Since the end of the 1990s, local governments in Japan have enacted Information Disclosure Ordinances, which require the disclosure of official government information. This paper uses Japanese prefecture-level data for the period 1998?2004 to examine how this enactment affected the rate of government construction expenditure. The Dynamic Panel model is used to control for unobserved prefecture-specific effects and endogenous bias. The major finding is that disclosure of government information reduces the rate of government construction expenditure. This implies that information disclosure reduces losses from rent-seeking activity, which is consistent with public choice theory.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Government transparency and expenditure in the rent-seeking industry: the case of Japan for 1998-2004|
|Keywords:||Information disclosure; Special interest group; Construction expenditure; Rent seeking|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations > H79 - Other
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
|Depositing User:||eiji yamamura|
|Date Deposited:||21. Mar 2011 14:01|
|Last Modified:||14. Feb 2013 01:07|
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